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Notebooks, 1914–1916
This considerably revised second edition of Wittgenstein’s 1914-16 notebooks contains a new appendix with photographs of Wittgenstein’s original work, a new preface by Elizabeth Anscombe, and a useful index by E.D. Klemke. Corrections have been made throughout the text, and notes have been added, making this the definitive edition of the notebooks. The writings intersperse Wittgenstein’s technical logical notations with his thoughts on the meaning of life, happiness, and death. “When the first edition of this collection of remarks appeared in 1961 we were provided with a glimpse of the workings of Wittgenstein’s mind during the period when the seminal ideas of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus were being worked out. This second edition provided the occasion to be struck anew by the breadth, rigor, and above all the restlessness of that mind.” – T. Michael McNulty, S. J., The Modern Schoolman

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In 1950, Wittgenstein tried to have all of his old notebooks destroyed. Thankfully, three sets of texts escaped this unhappy fate. The first two are some of Wittgenstein’s personal notebooks from August 1914 to October 1915, found at the house of his sister; these comprise the main content of this book. The third set consists of three texts from the collection of Bertrand Russell, which are printed as appendices. The first appendix is Wittgenstein’s 1913 ”Notes on Logic,” which was his first attempt to formulate a comprehensive, proto-Tractatus. The second is a few pages of notes that Wittgenstein dictated to G.E. Moore in 1914, who came to visit while Wittgenstein was living isolated with his thoughts in Norway. The third appendix consists of extracts of Wittgenstein’s letters to
Russell. In the second edition of this book, images of a few passages of Wittgenstein’s symbolism are printed in a fourth appendix; these were omitted from the first edition because no one could make heads or tails of them. (As far as this reviewer knows, no progress has been made there.) In a lovely preface to the first edition of this text, first published in 1961, the editors give expression to the role that this text can play for the students of Wittgenstein. Unfortunately, it was omitted from the second edition, and so I quote from it here: "We publish this material as an aid to students of the Tractatus. Most of it is no easier than the Tractatus itself; it naturally shews development; thus when it appears to present views different from those of the Tractatus, there is no need to reconcile the two. It should not be used without more ado as evidence for particular interpretations of the Tractatus. It does shew clearly, however, what problems formed the context of Wittgenstein’s remarks in the Tractatus; in this way it will serve to cut short some argument where wholly irrelevant contexts are supposed by an interpretation." (v)

Indeed, this book is simply invaluable to any serious student of the Tractatus; I cannot imagine studying one without the other. Passages in the notebooks are cross-referenced with similar or identical ones found in the Tractatus, and helpful comments are given in footnotes by the editors. Although not all of Wittgenstein’s cryptic personal remarks shed light on his published work, many of them provide the blessing of context for propositions in the Tractatus that are otherwise maddeningly opaque. As for the extent to which the Notebooks might reduce some of the extensive dispute about how to interpret Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: that much remains, appropriately, in extensive dispute. But if you have ever tried to tackle what may be Wittgenstein’s most difficult work, only to find yourself banging your head against the pages, I guarantee that you will find great satisfaction in reading this book.

This book shows well the development of Wittgenstein’s early thought. It is easier to see where his influences effected his thought. The metaphysical nature of his early thinking and his debt to Schopenhauer are clearer in this text than they are in any other. I have substracted one star only because I prefer his later thinking, and these notes, as the title states, are only from 1914 through 1916.

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein (1889-1951) was an Austrian-British philosopher whose books such as Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and Philosophical Investigations are among the acknowledged classics of 20th century philosophy. Born into a wealthy family, he gave all of his inheritance away, served in the Austrian Army during World War I, taught schoolchildren in remote Austrian villages, but ultimately taught at Cambridge for many years. The
Tractatus was the only book he published during his lifetime, but his papers have been posthumously edited, and notes of lectures taken by his students have been transcribed, and have resulted in many published books, such as Lectures & Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, & Remarks, The Blue and Brown Books, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology, Remarks on Colour, Zettel, etc. He wrote, "Logic must take care of itself." [22.8.14] He added, "Logic must in a certain sense be impossible for us to go wrong in logic. This is already partly expressed by saying: Logic must take care of itself. This is an extremely profound and important insight." [2.9.14] He notes, "One often makes a remark and only later realizes HOW true it is." [10.10.14] He wrote, "In this work more than in any other it is rewarding to keep on looking at questions, which once considered solved, from another quarter, as if they were unsolved." [13.11.14] He advises, "Don’t worry about what you have already written. Just keep on beginning to think afresh as if nothing at all had happened yet." [15.11.14] He laments, "I cannot get from the nature of the proposition to the individual logical operations!!! That is, I cannot bring out how far the proposition is the PICTURE of the situation. I am almost inclined to give up all my efforts." [12.4.15, 15.4.15] He observes, "The urge towards the mystical comes of the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science. We FEEL that even if all POSSIBLE scientific questions are answered our problem is still not touched at all. Of course in that case there are no questions any more; and that is the answer." [25.5.5] He points out, "Mathematical sciences are distinguished from non-mathematical ones by treating of things of which ordinary language does not speak, whereas the latter talk about things that are generally familiar." [20.6.15] He notes, "At bottom the whole Weltanschauung of the moderns involves the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are explanations of natural phenomena. In this way they stop short at the laws of nature as at something IMPREGNABLE as men of former times did at God and fate." [6.5.16] He states, "What do I know about God and the purpose of life? I know that this world exists. That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field. That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning. That this meaning does not lie in it but outside it. That my will penetrates the world. That my will is good or evil. Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world. The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God. And connect with this the comparison of God to a father. To pray is to think about the meaning of life. I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will: I am completely powerless. I can only make myself independent of the world---and so in a certain sense master is by renouncing any influence of happenings." [11.6.16] He goes on, "To believe in a God means to understand the
question about the meaning of life. To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning| we ARE in a certain sense dependent, and what we are dependent on we can call God. In this sense God would simply be fate, or, what is the same thing: the world--which is independent of our will. I can make myself independent of fate. There are two godheads: the world and my independent I| Death is not an event in life. It is not a fact of the world. IF by eternity is understood not infinite temporal duration but non-temporality, then it can be said that a man lives eternally if he lives in the present.\[8.7.16\]Later, he suggests, A\| How things stand, is God. God is, how things stand. Only from the consciousness of the UNIQUENESS OF MY LIFE arises religion---science----and art.\[1.8.16\]Wittgenstein\'s notebooks are vastly illuminating not only for the Tractatus, but for the development of his thought, as well as A\| how he worked\ and came up with his ideas.

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